THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT ON PARTNERSHIPS: EVIDENCE FROM A REFUGEE SETTLEMENT

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Abstract

We measure the impact of employment by assessing its effect on the individual *and* their marital partnership in the Rohingya refugee camps. To do so, we randomly assign either the husband or wife to a six-week job. We find that partnerships in which men are employed create greater positive spillovers for their partners compared to those in which women are employed, leading to improved psychosocial well-being for both partners and better IPV outcomes for women. However, households with formerly employed women later exhibit a stronger preference for female work. These findings highlight that employment is a social experience, with implications for labor supply decisions and employment targeting policies.

Keywords: Employment, Psychosocial, Refugees

JEL Classification: D91, I31, J22

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1 Introduction

Understanding the benefits of employment has far-reaching policy implications: influencing support programs for the unemployed, government strategies for displaced populations, and local efforts to target assistance schemes. While the literature has quantified its impact on the individual — shaping financial stability, physical health, and mental well-being (Hussam et al., 2022) — the effects of employment likely extend beyond the employed person, reshaping the mental and physical states of those around them and transforming their relationships (Jahoda, 1982). To fully grasp the value of employment, we *must* look beyond the individual and consider effects *on those closest to them*. This paper seeks to, first, identify how the employment of an individual affects their own well-being *and* that of their spouse, and second, assess whether these effects differ by the gender of the employed. The paper then considers how individuals' preferences for employment are affected by their past exposure to employment for themselves or their spouse. These questions inform both how we model labor-supply decisions, as well as how we design labor policy, as policymakers in vulnerable communities are increasingly considering not whether, but to *whom*, they offer employment opportunities.

We address these questions in the world's largest refugee settlement, the Rohingya camps of Bangladesh, where social protection programs are widespread and unemployment is pervasive: only 7.8% of refugees in our sample engaged in wage labor during the month prior to our baseline survey. To estimate the value of employment, we implement a field experiment. Employment experiments are typically designed to randomize work to an individual and survey them on individual-level outcomes, with measures such as household income or consumption offering insight into the wellbeing of others. This approach overlooks two features critical to labor policy: the spillover effects of employment upon other household members that may not be internalized by the worker, and the key policy counterfactual of how the household would have fared were a different member offered employment instead. Our study addresses these gaps. We first randomly assign couples to an employment group or a control group. We then randomly select one spouse to receive the employment opportunity. We survey both the treated individual and their spouse on economic, mental, and relational outcomes, capturing effects upon a wide range of individual and household dynamics. In order to estimate long-term shifts in preferences over employment, we then return to these respondents fifteen months after the conclusion of the employment contract to elicit, through a surprise work opportunity, whether they prefer to take the job themselves or instead give it to their partner.

The employment we offer is a surveying task wherein participants document activities

transpiring in their camp. This task was designed to be suitable for both men and women and was thoroughly tested in a previous study (Hussam et al., 2022). In a companion paper, we disentangle the impact of employment into those of working without pay (volunteering), and receiving an unconditional cash transfer (Hsu et al., 2025).

We present our results in five steps. First, we consider whether the employment treatment works as intended. While we see no detectable change in consumption, employment significantly increases participants' savings, reduces their debt, raises their time spent in productive activity, and reduces their time spent in leisure.[1] In other words, the employment intervention appears to be both "gainful" and "work." These effects are statistically indistinguishable by gender.

Second, we estimate the effects of employment on the psychosocial wellbeing of the employed and their partners. We find that employed men gain 0.112 SD ($p = 0.001$) in their psychosocial wellbeing index, an inverse-covariance-weighted index of depression severity, stress, life satisfaction, sociability, purposefulness, self-worth, locus of control, and stability. They report significant reductions in depression and improvements in purposefulness, life-satisfaction, sociability, and locus of control. Employed women gain 0.088 SD ($p = 0.036$) in their psychosocial index. They report significant reductions in depression and feelings of greater stability and life-satisfaction. We underscore this latter finding; *ex ante* it is not obvious that employment would be a source of improved wellbeing for women in our sample, 95% of whom had never been gainfully employed in their previous lives in Myanmar.[2]

Both men and women experience psychosocial benefits from working, but whether their spouse also benefits depends on whether the worker is the man or the woman in the partnership. We find that the wives of employed men experience large and statistically significant psychosocial gains (0.104 SD, $p = 0.023$) from their husband being employed, driven by reductions in depression severity and improvements in purposefulness and self-worth. These gains are statistically equivalent both to those of their employed husbands and their employed female counterparts. In contrast, we find that the husbands of employed women exhibit no detectable change in their wellbeing (-0.007 SD, $p = 0.833$). In other words, we find no evidence that these men are happier because their wives are happier, nor do they appear to be upset by a wife who is working when they are not. In sum, we find that em-

[1] Participants appear to share their payment with their spouses, as both treated participants their spouses report similar (statistically indistinguishable) effects on financial outcomes. In contrast, time use changes are limited to the treated participant, with the exception of partner women of treated men substituting sleep for relaxation.

[2] In our companion paper (Hsu et al., 2025), we demonstrate that the benefits of this work are significantly greater than both those of working without pay or receiving cash alone, suggesting that the benefits from work are not driven by engaging in productive activity nor relieving financial stress, but rather the combination of the two in the experience of gainful employment.

ployment generates substantial psychosocial spillovers, but the direction and magnitude of the spillover depends on the gender of the recipient.

Third, we examine the impact of employment on the relational health between partners, as proxied by intimate partner violence (IPV). We find that neither employed men nor women experience a detectable change in IPV (employed women exhibit a small but statistically insignificant reduction). Reassuringly, we can also reject violent backlash by unemployed husbands against their employed female partners, a phenomenon documented in recent literature (Bergvall, 2024; Perova, Reynolds, and Schmutte, 2023) (though not all –(Kotsadam and Villanger, 2022)).

While neither men nor women experience IPV reductions from employment, whether their spouse is affected once again depends on their identity. We observe large and statistically significant (0.133 SD, $p = 0.068$) reductions in an IPV index among the wives of employed men, amounting to a 30% reduction in the likelihood of a physical threat by their husband in the previous month. In contrast, we do not find that the husbands of employed women experience a significant change in IPV.

We document that gainful employment economically and psychosocially benefits both men and women equally, but wives of employed men experience significant improvements in both their psychosocial and relational health, while the husbands of employed women do not. In other words, partnerships in which men are employed appear to fare better than those in which women are employed. This motivates our fourth set of outcomes: "agency." We consider Sen's (1999) distinction between wellbeing and agency, specifically in the context of evolving gender norms. Shifting deep-seated norms is not painless: it may entail a short-term cost (psychosocial and relational health) in service of a long-term benefit (equity via greater female agency). In other words, while partnerships in which women work may show smaller improvements in mental and relational health, they could still be driving meaningful shifts in agency and norms. We examine a fairly exhaustive set of both revealed and self-reported measures of agency, as proxied by household power dynamics (bargaining, actions and norms) and aspirations for children. We broadly find null effects across these outcomes.

Given the psychosocial and relational health costs to female employment relative to male employment, and the absence of compensating improvements in agency insofar as we can measure, we return to our respondents to better understand their preferences over employment within the partnership. For our fifth and final result, we examine revealed preferences for female work in a labor supply elicitation exercise that we conduct fifteen months after the conclusion of the main experiment. Among the households in which one partner was formerly employed by us, we present each member with the opportunity to take a one-week paid job for themselves, or give it to their partner. We then progressively raise the wage of

their non-preferred option until indifference, enabling us to price the gender preference. We find that women who were formerly employed are 17.9 percentage points (29%) more likely than the wives of formerly employed men to prefer taking the job themselves ($q = 0.007$).[3] The husbands of formerly employed women are 23.9 percentage points (96%) more likely than formerly employed men to prefer giving the opportunity to their wives ($q = 0.004$). This is a large effect: while the average man who was formerly employed prefers taking the job himself unless his wife earns a daily wage that is 63% greater, the average man whose wife had been formerly employed prefers that *she* take the job, and is willing to give up 28% of the base wage rate for it. In other words, the experience of a woman working for a mere six weeks appears sufficient to meaningfully shift both the woman and her husbands' revealed preferences towards the woman working more than one year later.

We view this paper as providing a proof-of-concept around the social impacts of employment. Taken in sum, our results suggest that employment opportunities impact not only oneself, but one's partnership; both the magnitude and the direction of these spillovers, however, depends on *who* receives the opportunity. Households in which men receive an employment opportunity fare better in both their psychosocial wellbeing and prevalence of intimate partner violence than households in which women receive the opportunity. However, these latter households - both the wife and the husband - are significantly more in favor of the woman working, suggestive of a deeper norms shift at play.

Social protection policies, such as cash transfer programs, job training initiatives, and cash-for-work programs, often allocate resources and target beneficiaries with the goal of promoting gender inclusion. Our results suggest such mandates could lead to unintended consequences in the short-run such as increased abuse and reduced psychosocial well-being compared to male participation. Our labor elicitation exercise points to a possible alternative approach: rather than directly mandating female employment, programs could first introduce communities to new experiences through short-term, low-stakes employment opportunities for women. This would allow households to gradually adapt and determine their own optimal labor allocation based on a host of factors that a policymaker may not be able to observe – those who see greater benefits from female employment may allocate work to women (as many in our sample choose to do), while others may choose male participation instead.

We make three contributions to the literature. First, we speak to the growing literature on the impacts of social protection programs that target men versus women. These programs primarily focus on financial support, such as cash transfers, assets, or bank accounts, and

[3]We report q-values based on the sharpened False Discover Rate following Anderson (2008). Note, when reporting significance for inverse-covariance weighted indices (as above for the psychosocial index and IPV index), we instead report p-values.

assess their effects on women's empowerment, bargaining power, and labor supply (Field et al. (2021); Armand et al. (2020); Haushofer and Shapiro (2016); Duflo and Udry (2004); Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997)). Closely related is Bhalotra et al. (2021), who examine the consequences of male and female job loss from mass layoffs in Brazil on domestic violence and find a 32% increase in IPV when men lost their jobs in mass layoffs in Brazil. Our study is among the first to randomize access to an employment opportunity between couples and measure financial wellbeing, psychosocial and relational health, and agency.

Second, we speak to a small body of work on the spillover impacts of social protection programs upon other members of the household. While individually-reported outcomes on measures such as income, consumption, or bargaining power offer some insight into the welfare of others, we show that key dimensions of a spouses' wellbeing cannot be captured without directly surveying them, and without which the value of the program may be significantly under- *or* over-estimated. In closely related ongoing work, research by Balantrapu et al. (2024) investigates the impacts of cash-for-work programs implemented by the World Food Program (WFP) in four different countries, also randomizing the program across spouses and surveying both. To our knowledge, no other studies have randomized the identity of the beneficiary and surveyed the spouse to provide a more comprehensive assessment of a social protection program's impact on well-being.[4]

Lastly, we take the policy implications of the trade-offs to targeting seriously: in a world where policymakers may not know what weights to place on different outcomes (well-being versus agency and norms), how might beneficiaries themselves choose? To our knowledge, ours is the first paper to elicit incentivized measures of beneficiaries' (and their spouses') own targeting preferences, a sort of individual sufficient statistic for the complex combination of outcomes that a social protection program may impact.

We qualify this work with a note on our field context. This research is conducted in the Rohingya refugee camps of Bangladesh, home to nearly one million refugees who fled an ethnic cleansing campaign by the Myanmar government in 2017. The trauma of their violent expulsion paired with the nature of refugee camp life are reflected in our sample population, 20% of whom report being at least moderately depressed. Existence in the camps is challenging: refugees rely on minimal food rations, they are not granted work permits, and informal work opportunities remain scarce. The community is characterized by conservative gender norms: in our sample, 75% of women believe that wife-beating is at least sometimes justified.[5] These features must be considered in the interpretation of our findings. The

[4](Haushofer et al., 2023) also study the effects of an unconditional cash transfer program on social preferences of children by interviewing the children themselves.

[5]The most recent national-level estimates in the region (which use a slightly different set of questions) are 20% in Bangladesh and 51% in Myanmar.(ICF, 2016, 2018)

relative psychosocial gains we observe to male employment relative to female employment may be a lower bound if stigma surrounding female work is less pronounced under the dire circumstances of refugee camp life. Alternatively, these relative effects may be an upper bound if the stress and uncertain circumstances faced by refugees trigger stronger reactions to shifting norms. These are empirical questions worthy of future study when assessing the generalizability of our results. However, we operate intentionally in this setting given the vulnerability of the community and the rapidly growing refugee population globally. Beyond the refugee setting, we believe these findings can be informative for other contexts in which individuals occupy traditional gender norms and face pervasive unemployment.

2 Research Context

2.1 Recent Events

In August of 2017, the Myanmar military executed a series of "Clearance Operations" in Rakhine State, Myanmar. The operations were targeted at the Rohingya ethnic minority, who have been denied citizenship in Myanmar since 1982 and are now the world's largest stateless population. Over the course of four months, gang rapes and sexual violence were perpetrated against an estimated 18,000 women and girls, an estimated 36,000 Rohingya were thrown into fires, and at least 25,000 Rohingya were killed. Among those who survived, over 750,000 entered Bangladesh, building and settling into what is now the largest refugee camp in the world (Habib et al., 2018). They joined several hundred thousand Rohingya refugees from earlier episodes of ethnic violence, with the current population in the camps exceeding 900,000 individuals (Hussam et al., 2022).

2.2 Camp Life

There are currently 34 Rohingya refugee camps in Bangladesh, with each camp divided into blocks containing 60 to 130 households. As shown in Table A1, the average female refugee in our study is 28 years old; 76% of women in our sample have never received formal education. The average male refugee in our study is 32 years old, and 61% have had no formal education.

Employment Because of legal restrictions on refugee employment (Bhatia et al., 2018), many refugees find themselves without work opportunities. Some seek employment in the informal sector outside the camps, a risky endeavor. Among their limited job prospects are roles as agricultural workers, construction day laborers, or street stall operators, with the primary source of employment for refugees coming from NGOs (Mree, 2019). Refugees

are engaged in work by these NGOs in two ways. The first is through cash-for-work programs, where they (officially) receive a flat daily rate of 350 taka (3.50 USD) for 32 days of work spread over a quarter. The second is through unskilled volunteering, where refugees are typically paid 50 taka (0.50 USD) per hour to assist with ad-hoc operational tasks (Refugee Relief, 2018).

Time-use A typical day for a woman, as captured by asking time spent on various activities the previous day (Table A2), involves 8 hours sleeping, 0 hours engaged in wage work, 3 hours doing chores outside the house, 3 hours doing chores inside the house, 3 hours actively taking care of elders, children, and the sick, 2 hours actively taking care of oneself, and 3 hours resting, relaxing, or in religious activities. A typical day for a male participant consists of 8 hours sleeping, 0 hours engaged in wage work, 2 hours doing chores outside the house, 3 hours doing chores inside the house, 2 hours actively taking care of elders, children, and the sick, 2 hours actively taking care of oneself, and 5 hours resting, relaxing, or in religious activities.

Consumption and Savings Having left the bulk of their possessions in Myanmar and remaining five years in the camps where income-generating opportunities remain scarce, most refugees possess few economically valuable assets and minimal savings. The average participant in our study reports savings at baseline of 302 taka (USD $3), with the median participant reporting zero savings.

Every refugee in the camps receives a monthly e-voucher of 1050 taka (10 USD) through the Bangladeshi government and the World Food Programme. This voucher allows them to purchase a limited quantity of food staples, including a maximum of thirteen kilograms of rice, two kilograms of lentils, one liter of oil, and ten eggs. Despite the common grievance that these rations are insufficient, refugees often resell portions of these staples to neighbors in the Bangladeshi host community at discounted rates in order to secure the cash required to purchase other basic foods which the e-voucher does not qualify for, such as salt or vegetables. This e-voucher remains the only reliable source of income for refugees.

Mental Health We see that 22% of women and 18% of men in our sample qualify as at least moderately depressed according to the PHQ-9 screening tool. 44% (54%) report thinking of themselves as having little worth, and 22% (18%) report having had suicidal ideation in the week before our baseline survey.

3 Experimental Design

3.1 Sampling Strategy

The research team recruited 1080 households from 10 camps.[6] Each camp is divided into 4 to 7 blocks, and within each block, there are 14 to 42 sub-blocks, which serve as our unit of randomization. We selected nine households per sub-block.

Households were recruited using a random walk procedure. Beginning near the center of a sub-block, the field team randomly identified a direction along which they approached households door-to-door. Each household was informed that our partner organization (RTM International) may have an opportunity for them to work for up to four hours per day for four days a week over six weeks. We clarified that we had not yet secured our funds for this activity, and we would not have enough work opportunities for everyone. At the time being, we wished to know whether both members of the married couple would be able and interested in working for us, and whether they would be willing to meet with us for ten minutes every week for six weeks to answer survey questions (with compensation of 50 taka weekly) in the case that we could not offer them paid work. If households voiced interest, the field team confirmed that there existed a married couple in the household who satisfied the following eligibility criteria: both members were between the ages of 18 and 45, able and willing to work, and had not worked for more than 10 hours in the past two weeks. We also verified that they were recent arrivals and not relatives of the *majhi*, the politically most powerful individual in each camp who served as the liaison with humanitarian groups on humanitarian aid distribution. Prior to all field work, the research team secured permission from government authorities to operate in the camps and offer the interventions through our NGO partner, RTM International.

3.2 Experimental Design

We randomly assign 80 sub-blocks to "work" and 40 sub-blocks to "control". In control sub-blocks, participants receive 50 taka (USD $0.50) per weekly survey. In work sub-blocks, participants are offered work for four days per week, earning 300 taka (USD $3) per day, totaling 1200 taka weekly. In our companion paper (Hsu et al., 2025), we benchmark the work intervention against two alternative treatments: cash and volunteering. In cash sub-blocks, participants receive the same 1200 taka (USD $12) weekly as an unconditional cash transfer. In volunteering (unpaid work) sub-blocks, participants have the opportunity to engage in the same activity as those in the work group for no pay, besides the 50 taka received for

[6] Additional households were recruited for different treatment arms, which we report in (Hsu et al., 2025).

completing weekly surveys. This paper focuses on comparing the work intervention to the control group, so we exclude the sample randomized into the cash and volunteering groups.[7]

We randomize each treatment household into having *either* the husband or the wife receive the treatment. All households are informed of the six-week study duration, with surveyors returning weekly for brief surveys and compensation. We make the randomized treatment allocation publicly known to all participants by displaying their randomized treatment status on the surveyors' tablet screens. Our sample is balanced across arms (Appendix Table A3).

Employment intervention details Our employment intervention replicates that of Hussam et al. (2022).[8] Workers were assigned four workdays per week for a total of 24 days of work over the six weeks, with all dates predetermined and noted on a calendar which was given as a gift to all participants. Workers received 300 taka per day of work. Relative to the WFP's e-voucher of 1050 taka per month, our intervention almost quadruples potential monthly consumption. This wage is also comparable to that of other paid work opportunities that refugees have access to: among those who worked within our study sample, reported past wages vary from 300 taka per day for unskilled work with NGOs to 700 taka for skilled work. 85% (99%) of men (women) reported no work in the past month (Table A1).

Individuals who were assigned to the work opportunity first watched an instructional video we produced to describe the work task. Enumerators then explained the task verbally. The task involved selecting fifteen same-sex neighbors and marking these individuals' activities four times per day on a set of illustrative time-use worksheets (Figure 1). We informed participants that we were interested in understanding the typical daily activities of camp residents and that neighbors' identities, which we never asked for, would remain anonymous to both the surveyors and the research team.

Participants dropped off their worksheets at the end of the workday in a tamper-proof box at the home of a pre-assigned refugee neighbor within each sub-block (the 'facilitator'). Facilitators were also members of the work treatment arm and had no access to the contents of the box. They were asked to place a sheet at the end of the day's work with the day's date, so that any submission below that sheet was time-stamped to having been submitted on that day. The facilitators received an additional 50 taka per week for providing this assistance.

At the end of the week, each worker would come to the facilitator's home, where an enumerator checked the participant's work for any mistakes (eg. no missing sheets, submission

[7]We compensate the control group and the unpaid group with the same amounts earned by the work and cash groups after the study concluded.

[8]The one notable departure from the work activity of Hussam et al. (2022) is that we did not embed an explicit community-centered purpose to the work.

made on the correct days; fifteen tick marks per sheet; no replication across days or obvious variation in handwriting suggesting someone else had done their work). To encourage high-quality work, we introduced a pay penalty: mistakes over two consecutive weeks would result in no payment for the following week, with penalties starting from the fourth week. However, participants were never at risk of losing their job nor otherwise being punished by the employer (the enumerator). The participant received their payment after the enumerator verified the quality of their work and administered the short survey.

The work task was designed with several considerations in mind. First, we aimed for equal participation between men and women, so we chose a task that did not involve strenuous manual labor but still required physical and mental effort. Workers performed repetitive movements outdoors, and completing the task required focus. Additionally, the task was intended to occupy a substantial portion of the day without being a full-time commitment, requiring approximately three hours each workday. Second, because not all participants were literate, we devised a task that demanded no literacy or numeracy skills beyond basic counting. The time-sheet was a visual tool featuring a comprehensive list of activities commonly undertaken by individuals in the camps: for example, eating, napping, going to the market, getting rations, and praying. Workers simply needed to place tick marks below the illustrated depictions of the activities they observed their neighbors engaging in. Third, we crafted a task that encouraged workers to leave their homes and be exposed to others, but did not *necessitate* socialization. Workers could silently observe their neighbors and complete their worksheets, or they could engage in conversation if they chose to.[9] In sum, we designed a work task that was comparable to the non-manual employment opportunities available in the camp through NGOs. It accommodated the constraints of our study population and sought to be neither too attractive nor too unattractive within the refugee camp context.

4 Data Collection and Survey Instruments

4.1 Timeline and survey instruments

We conducted a baseline survey, administered to both members of each recruited couple, in January of 2023. One week after the survey, enumerators revisited each household to disclose their randomized treatment status and conduct the first midline survey. Thereafter, we met with the participating household member weekly, checked their work if they were assigned to the work arm, conducted a short survey, and then made the relevant payments.

[9] Hussam et al. (2022) finds that workers did not engage in additional conversations during workdays, but did on non-work days.

We conducted an endline survey five weeks after the start of work: crucially, we wished to perform the endline while treated participants were still engaged with the work. We observe a 3% attrition rate among the treated and 5% among partners at the endline, which does not differ across treatment arms or gender (Appendix Table A4). A follow-up survey took place approximately six weeks after the endline to ensure that participants did not experience any negative effects from the work opportunity.[10] Fifteen months after the conclusion of the intervention, we conducted a second follow-up survey in which we elicited labor supply preferences for a one-week employment opportunity.

4.2 Outcome variables

All outcomes we describe below are collected via the surveys described above. The questions in these surveys were drawn from previous work in the camps (Hussam et al., 2022) and piloted extensively with households that were not included in the study sample. We describe the outcomes below and refer the reader to Appendix B for the full list of questions.

Finances and Time-use These outcomes are used to confirm that the employment intervention worked as intended, shifting respondents financial portfolio and use of time. We collect three measures of how money is used: consumption, savings, and loans. We rely on a time-use survey module designed by (Field et al., 2022) to categorize time spent on productive activities, sleep/leisure and idle time.

Psychosocial wellbeing We measure eight dimensions of psychosocial wellbeing, including depression (PHQ-9), locus of control (Levenson's Scales), life satisfaction (Diener's Satisfaction With Life Scale), stress (Cohen's Perceived Stress Scale), sociability (positive conversations), stability (Cantril Self-Anchoring Striving Scale), purpose, and self-worth. We standardize all outcomes for comparability.[11] We combine these measures into a single psychosocial (PS) index, using an inverse covariance-weighted average of the standardized outcomes.

Intimate partner violence (IPV) We measure intimate partner violence by asking women ten questions about instances of IPV. We draw six questions from the Demographic

[10]Indeed, we find no evidence of any worsening of outcomes in treatment households; results available upon request.

[11]When standardizing outcomes, we standardize by gender of the respondent to account for differences in distribution between men and women. Note that because we present results by gender subgroups (e.g. partner women), control means presented in tables will not be mean zero.

Health Surveys (DHS), and one from (Field et al., 2021), exploring occurrences of psychological abuse. We include a question from the DHS that examines physical abuse, asking whether the husband has threatened the respondent or someone close to them with harm. Due to cultural sensitivities, we could not directly ask about instances of physical abuse (hitting, slapping, etc.) as done in the DHS. Instead, we included two questions to assess attitudes toward and tolerance of physical abuse perpetrated by men. We combine each set of questions on psychological and physical abuse into summary indices, and then further combine these two measures into an overall IPV index. For men, for whom questions on physical abuse and certain forms of psychological abuse by their female partners would be regarded as strange and culturally dissonant, we ask only about their experiences of psychological abuse using four of the seven questions administered to women.

Agency We investigate two outcomes that fall under the broad category of agency: 1) household power dynamics; and 2) aspirations for children.

We capture household power dynamics in three ways. First, we play an incentivized bargaining game drawn from McKelway (2020). We invite both members of a couple to decide how to allocate 250 taka (2.50 USD) between themselves and their spouse. Both respondents play this game independently with separate enumerators, and then together. Their responses at each stage are written on chits and placed in a tin alongside a random number. One chit is drawn at random, which corresponds to the amount the respondent receives. Second, we capture household power dynamics by asking respondents about their actions: how they engage in conversation with their partner through a series of questions drawn from IRC (2022); and how decisions over consumption and time-use are made within the household (as in (Balantrapu et al., 2024))

Finally we measured household dynamics by asking about gendered norms. As in (Balantrapu et al., 2024), we ask a series of nine questions designed to track how respondents think decisions over consumption and time-use *should* be made within the household. Next, we draw two questions from IRC (2022) to assess the respondent's view of the respectability of a man who consults his wife for important decisions or helps her with chores. Similarly, we construct an index of norms for women in the workplace composed of three questions around the appropriateness of women working for pay.

Turning to aspirations for children: we include these questions within our exploration of agency, as preferences around deep social norms are often expressed through hopes for one's children rather than changes to one's own life. We ask respondents their preferred level of education for their oldest daughter and their oldest son. We also adapt, for cultural relevance, a survey module developed by (Field et al., 2021) that asks respondents to choose a

hypothetical husband (wife) for a daughter (son) they have (or may have in the future). The respondent must choose between two son-in-laws of equal status, but with one permitting the respondent's daughter to work outside for pay and the other not; likewise, the respondent must choose between two daughter-in-laws of equal status, but one wishes to work outside the home for pay.

Labor Market Preferences To capture long-term labor market preferences across partners, we design and perform an incentivized labor supply elicitation exercise fifteen months after the conclusion of the experiment with households assigned to the work treatment. We privately present each partner in the household with a surprise offer of a one-week work opportunity funded by a surplus budget. We inform each respondent that this will be their final opportunity to work with us and clarify that, due to limited funding, only one member - either the respondent or their partner - will be permitted to participate. We then ask respondents to indicate whether, at 200 taka per day, they prefer to work themselves or give the opportunity to their partner. Progressively raising the wage for the non-preferred individual, we assess the strength of their preference, determined by how much money is required to convince the respondent to switch their choice to the non-preferred partner. Respondents are aware that the computer will then randomly assign the task to either (i) the preferred worker at 200 taka, (ii) the non-preferred partner at their switching wage, (iii) the preferred worker at a "secret-keeping wage" of 220 taka (the amount unknown beforehand to the respondent and included to protect anonymity of the partner's responses), or (iv) one of these three options from the partner's survey, which is conducted in parallel. The full script is presented in Appendix E

Multiple hypothesis testing We use two strategies to account for the range of hypotheses we test. First, we report our primary outcomes, psychosocial wellbeing and intimate partner violence, as inverse-covariance weighted index variables following Anderson (2008). Second, with each table, we calculate the sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) q-values to control for the expected proportion of individual rejections that are type I errors (Anderson, 2008).

Pre-analysis plan (PAP) This study was pre-registered on the AEA Registry. The main deviation from the PAP is that, in order to focus our exposition on employment's impact on the lives of those closest to the employed, analysis of the cash and work without pay treatment arms has been moved to a companion paper Hsu et al. (2025). As a result of this decision, we also significantly reorganized the outcomes from how they are presented in the PAP. These deviations from the PAP are described in more detail in Appendix Section C.

5 Experimental Results

5.1 Empirical Framework

We now estimate the effects of work for treated men, partner women, treated women, and partner men, using the following specification:

$$Y_{ibc}^{1} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Work_{ibc} + \gamma_c + \delta_e + Y_{ibc}^{0} + X_{ibc} + \varepsilon_{ibc} \tag{1}$$

where Y_{ibc}^{1} represents the relevant outcome for individual i in sub-block b and camp c, X_{ibc} is a vector of sociodemographic controls selected via double-selection LASSO following Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2014), and ε_{ibc} is an error term which we cluster at the block level. We include fixed effects for camp γ_c and enumerator δ_e.[12] We control for the baseline value of the outcome variable Y_{ibc}^{0}, when available, in an ANCOVA specification following McKenzie (2012). Our coefficient of interest is β_1, the impact of employment.

5.2 First stage

Completion of work We first establish that treated participants engage in the work. Figure 2 exhibits the fraction of individuals assigned to the data-collection task who completed their work in each week. Participants consistently exhibit greater than 90% completion rates.

We then consider whether the employment opportunity meaningfully altered their use of time. Table 1 demonstrates that treated participants shifted their time spent in a typical day away from idleness or sleep (by 2.8 hours) towards productive activities (by 2.3 hours). Tables A6 and A5 present a more detailed breakdown of time-use by gender. Both working men and women shift time away from caring for family, self, relaxing, sleeping and doing chores in order to perform the work. Men also appear to reduce the amount of time spent on self-employment activities.

Table 2 then explores the impact of the treatments on financial behavior. We document significant increases in savings (151%) and significant reductions in borrowing (27%), with no meaningful changes in consumption or lending. Tables A8 and A7 disaggregate these results by the gender of the treated beneficiary: we see no systematic differences between treated men or women. We also observe that both treated sexes share their additional income with their spouses, as evidenced by significant improvements in both partner husbands' and partner wives' savings and sense of financial stability as well as a reduction in their outstanding debt. We further investigate whether men and women exhibit different consumption patterns

[12] We include enumerator fixed effects following Di Maio and Fiala (2019) in order to account for the fact that respondents' answers to sensitive questions may be influenced by the specific enumerator.

across the full set of products we ask about (Appendix Tables A10 and A9). While treated men are more likely to spend on education and treated women are more likely to spend on luxury goods (paan, cigarettes, tea and coffee) and small household items, the differences between both groups are small.

5.3 Psychosocial wellbeing

We now examine the impact of employment on psychsocial wellbeing. As described above, our measure of psychosocial wellbeing is an index of depression severity, stress, life satisfaction, sociability, purposefulness, self-worth, locus of control, and stability. Table 3 presents impacts on treated women and their partners. Employed women experience a 0.088 SD improvement ($p = 0.036$) in their psychosocial wellbeing (Panel A, Column 1). This effect is relatively large. (Ridley et al., 2020) conducted a meta-analysis on the mental health impacts of multi-faceted anti-poverty interventions—including livestock transfers, business training, and employment—finding an average effect of 0.1 SD per $1,000 PPP in cash transfers. Our intervention achieves the same effect size with only a fraction of that transfer amount. This result is driven by a substantial reduction in depressive symptoms (0.203 SD) and a greater sense of stability (0.108 SD) and life satisfaction (0.125 SD). Panel B turns to the husbands of treated women. We document no systematic impacts of wives' employment on husbands' wellbeing, with an effect size of -0.007 SD.

We then consider male beneficiaries in Table 4. Like women, employed men experience significant improvements in their psychosocial wellbeing, exhibiting a 0.112 SD increase in their index ($p = 0.001$), driven by reductions in depression severity (0.139 SD) and improvements in their life satisfaction (0.127 SD), sociability (0.100 SD), feeling of purposefulness (0.141 SD), and sense of control over their lives (0.192 SD). Importantly, we cannot reject equality between the impacts of employment on treated men and treated women ($p = 0.501$): women, despite few of them having ever worked for pay in our context, appear to benefit as much as men from an employment opportunity.

What of these men's wives? Panel B presents the psychosocial impacts of employment on a beneficiary's wife. Offering an employment opportunity to a husband leads to significant improvements in a wife's psychosocial wellbeing (0.104 SD, $p = 0.023$). Notably, we cannot reject that an employed woman and the wife of an employed man experience equivalent gains in psychosocial wellbeing ($p = 0.841$). Among these wives, effects manifest in a reduction in depression severity (0.200 SD) and stress (0.177 SD) a greater sense of purposefulness (0.135 SD) and self-worth (0.198 SD).

In sum, while we observe comparable impacts of employment on the psychosocial wellbe-

ing of working men and women, we observe significant differences in spillovers onto beneficiaries' spouses: husbands of treated women show little to no reaction, while wives of treated men exhibit substantial improvements in their wellbeing. This spillover pattern suggests that a *household's* overall mental health improves relatively more when the man receives the work opportunity. We now turn to our outcome of intimate partner violence to directly examine how employment affects relational health within a household.

5.4 Intimate partner violence

Table 5 presents the impact of employment on the IPV index – an index of experiences of psychological abuse and physical abuse – within the households of treated women.[13] We observe moderate but statistically insignificant reductions in IPV experienced both by employed women (Panel A) and the husbands of these women (Panel B). Table A11 disaggregates the psychological and physical abuse indices and presents outcomes as binary variables for whether the action ever occurred within the past month or whether the behavior was tolerated/accepted.

We next turn to the impact of employment on IPV within the households of treated men (Table 6). Employed men (Panel A) report experiencing a moderate but statistically insignificant increase in psychological abuse from their wives, driven by a 21% increase in reported jealousy (Table A12). What of the wives of employed husbands? Offering employment to husbands (Panel B) yields large and statistically significant reductions in IPV reported by their wives (0.133 SD – p-value = 0.068). This is driven by a reduction in the index of physical abuse (0.158 SD). Though the individual (sub-index) effects are imprecise, all the sub-components are negative and we see a 30% reduction in the probability women reported their husbands threatened to harm them or someone close to them, a 5% reduction in the probability they say a wife should ever tolerate being beaten by her husband, and a 23% reduction in the probability of the woman reporting that her husband restricted visits with friends.

Considering both the psychosocial and IPV results, we find that the effects on partners of those who are employed differ significantly by gender. Partnerships in which men receive an employment opportunity experience better mental health outcomes and lower rates of abuse than those in which women receive the opportunity. Considered in isolation, these results have implications for the targeting of social protection programs, many of which are increasingly directing resources specifically towards *women* instead of men (UN, 2019). But the aim of these social protection programs is often one of female empowerment (WFP,

[13]Due to cultural sensitivity, we only ask the physical abuse questions to women. Therefore, we cannot create the IPV index for men.

2025), to which we turn next.

5.5 Agency

We operate in a context where the vast majority of women have never before worked for pay. To offer them gainful employment, particularly when their husband remains unemployed, represents a marked shift away from traditional gender norms. We therefore now take seriously the distinction made by Sen (1999) between wellbeing and agency within the context of evolving gender norms. Fulfilling deep-seated norms by providing men work may ease psychosocial stress and improve the physical safety of partnerships, but may simultaneously retrench or exacerbate male power in the long run. Conversely, shifting deep-seated norms by providing women the opportunity to work may entail a short-term cost in psychosocial wellbeing and physical abuse in service of the long-term benefit of equity via greater female agency. We evaluate these possibilities through an extensive set of measures on household dynamics (household bargaining, actions, and norms), and aspirations for one's children.

5.5.1 Household Dynamics

We first capture household dynamics by measuring bargainning power within the household. Tables 7 and 8 (Column 1 and 2) present evidence from an incentivized bargaining game modeled after McKelway (2020) that measures the power exerted by each member of a couple when bargaining over how to allocate a finite budget. Column 1 presents whether the wife participated (i.e. spoke up) in the bargaining process at all, as observed by the enumerator; and Column 2 shows whether the respondent successfully obtained, during negotiation, at least the amount that they stated they privately desired. Employment does not have meaningful impacts on the dynamics of the bargaining game in female or male-treated household.

Next, we analyze household power dynamics by asking about the actions of each partner. Column 3 reports impacts on respondents' self-perceived ability to alter their partner's position in the case of disagreement. We find no evidence that employed women exert greater influence (Table 7, Panel A), nor do we observe a retrenchment of power among employed men (Table 8, Panel A): if anything, men report being significantly less able to influence their partner's decisions. Turning to the partners of employed men and women (Table 7 and Table 8 Panel B), neither group reports a change in their ability to affect their partners' decisions. Column 4 reports an index of questions around how consumption and time-use decisions are made within the household. Neither employed women (Table 7, Panel A) nor employed men (Table 8, Panel A) experience greater decision-making power. The wives of employed men

(Panel B) do report a 0.9 SD reduction in the extent to which they make decisions in the household over consumption and time-use, but this coefficient also loses significance upon correction for multiple hypothesis testing.

Finally, we evaluate household power dynamics by examining a series of questions about norms and beliefs. Column 5 reports respondents answers to how they believe decisions about consumption and time-use *should* be made in the household. Neither employed women (Table 7, Panel A), employed men (Table 8, Panel A), nor their spouses (Panel B) experience any significant change in their beliefs about who should hold power. Columns 6 and 7 report respondents' agreement with non-traditional gender norms: whether men should help within the household, whether women should be able to work outside the home. Surprisingly, we do not find that employed women are any more likely to state that women should be able to work outside the home, nor do the beliefs of their partners change with regard to men in the household, women working, or the acceptability of IPV. Likewise, neither employed men nor their wives update their beliefs across any of these three measures (Table 8). In sum, we find little evidence of a redistribution of power as measured through the self-reported beliefs or practices of households in which a woman is employed relative to those in which the man is employed.

5.5.2 Aspirations

We next turn to beliefs about children. While adults may have difficulty altering their power preferences for themselves and their partners, there may be malleability in their expectations for the next generation. Tables 9 and 10 each present four outcomes: we first ask the respondent for the preferred level of education for their eldest (real or hypothetical) daughter and son (Columns 1 and 2). We then ask respondents whether they would prefer to have a daughter-in-law who wishes to work outside the home for pay or not (Column 3). Finally, we ask whether they would prefer to have a son-in-law who, all else equal, permits his wife (the respondent's real or hypothetical daughter) to work outside the home for pay or not.

Treated women (Panel A, Table 9) report no meaningful change in educational aspirations for their sons or daughters. However, they are significantly more likely (0.172 SD) to prefer a daughter-in-law who wishes to work for pay outside the home ($q = 0.027$). We observe no changes along any other margin for employed women. The husbands of treated women (Panel B, Table 9) exhibit large and statistically significant increases (0.317 SD) in the educational aspirations they have for their daughters ($q = 0.002$) but not their sons. At first pass, this seems encouraging: perhaps these men, having now experienced the improved wellbeing of their treated wives and households, wish the same for their daughters. However, changes in educational aspirations do not translate into changes in work norms: these men

do not deferentially prefer daughter-in-laws who wish to work for pay, nor son-in-laws who permit their wives to work for pay; in fact, while noisy, they appear to prefer the opposite. This combination of effects may suggest that the husbands of treated women desire greater education for their daughters in service of a better marriage match, a pattern observed in a variety of contexts (Goldin, 2006; Chiappori, Salanié, and Weiss, 2017; Ashraf et al., 2020): higher education, rather than serving as an avenue for improved labor market prospects, serves to improve the daughter's 'quality' in the marriage market such that she may be matched with a wealthier man who will not need his wife to work.

Turning to treated men and their wives (Table 10), we observe little movement along any of the outcomes. Treated men are neither more nor less likely to educate their daughters or prefer daughters who can work outside the home. Interestingly, the wives of employed men state a greater desire (0.15 SD) for both daughters and sons to become educated (both $q = 0.083$) and a preference for a son-in-law (0.16 SD) who allows her daughter to work outside the home ($q = 0.036$).

5.6 Labor Market Preferences

Despite the extensive range of outcomes we examine around household dynamics and aspirations, we find no evidence that the employment intervention alters the distribution of power or norms within the household in the short run. Paired with the evidence that the psychosocial and relational health of partnerships is higher when a husband is employed, we were keen to understand beneficiaries preferences for employment. We present our most direct measure of employment preferences across gender: an incentivized labor supply elicitation exercise. We conduct this exercise fifteen months after the conclusion of the six-week experiment, and therefore interpret the results as a measure of *long-term* changes in preferences due to a fairly brief intervention.

We design a choice experiment to elicit individual's preferences for their own relative to their partner's employment. Specifically, we return to all households in which one partner had previously received an employment opportunity in our experiment. Privately, we inform each member of the couple (i.e. both the formerly employed and their spouse) that we have a budget surplus with which we can offer one week of work, but the surplus only permits us to hire one member of the couple. We first ask each respondent to indicate, at a daily wage rate of 200 taka, who they prefer take the job. Conditional on their preference (self or partner), we then progressively raise the proposed wage for the non-preferred partner (keeping the preferred person's wage at 200 taka) until the respondent decides to shift their choice to the non-preferred. We use the switching point as a measure of the strength of their preference for

their own versus their partner's employment. For example, if a respondent prefers the man to work at a wage of 200 Tk and would require 300 Tk to switch to the woman working, we define the relative value of the woman working to be -100 Tk. Conversely, if the respondent prefers the woman to work at a wage of 200 Tk and would require 300 Tk for the man to work, the value of a woman working is set at +100 Tk.

We compare respondents in households where the woman was assigned to work, to households where the man was assigned to work (the comparison group in this case). Results are presented in Table 11. Panel A presents women's responses, and Panel B presents men's. Column 1 presents the proportion of respondents who prefer the woman to work at parity (200 Tk/day). We see that 63% of women in households where men previously received our employment opportunity (the comparison group), prefer taking the one-week job over giving it to their husband. However, households where *women* previously received our employment opportunity, 82% of women prefer taking the job themselves, a 17.9 percentage point (29%) increase in their preference for female employment. Column 2 reports the value of the woman working, which is the additional daily wage required to incentivize the respondent to choose the man to work. In households where men previously received the employment opportunity (the comparison group), women set the value of the woman working at 12.5 Tk, meaning they require only a small additional amount to prefer the man working instead. However, for women who were previously employed, this premium increases by 133 Tk, reaching a total of 146 Tk, which is equivalent to 73% of the base wage rate of 200 Tk.

This pattern is echoed among male respondents (Panel B). Among households where men previously received our employment opportunity, 25% of men prefer that their wife take the one-week job. Among households where *women* previously received our employment opportunity, this fraction jumps to 49%, a 23.9 percentage point (96%) increase, in preference for female employment. The differential strength of this preference is large. Among formerly employed men, we observe a negative value of women working of of -126 Tk, indicating that they would require an additional 126 Tk in wages for their wives to take the job instead. Conversely, men whose wives were formerly employed have a positive premium: they would require 55 Tk (-126 Tk + 188 Tk) to switch their preference to the man (themselves) working. In other words, they are willing to *give up* 55 taka, or 28% of the base wage rate, to have their wives work instead of themselves.

In summary, our incentivized labor supply elicitation exercise shows that, despite strong evidence of the the relative disadvantages for psychosocial well-being and relational health when women are employed, and no self-reported changes in household dynamics or aspirations during the intervention, respondents display a significant shift toward preferring female employment.

We caveat this exercise in several ways. First, our offer is for merely one week's worth of work. Perhaps gender preferences over employment would be different were the work of a longer duration. While we do not provide incentivized offers for long-term work, we do ask respondents whether their preference would change were their employment extended to six months. Results are consistent for formerly-employed women, who continue to express significantly stronger preferences to work. On the other hand, men in households where their wives were previously assigned work are only 4 percentage points (17 percent) more likely to prefer women to work, and this result is not statistically significant (Appendix Table A13). Moreover, while the effect on the value of women working is positive for men whose wives previously worked, the magnitude is considerably lower (62 vs 188). In contrast to the one week job, at six months men would need to *receive* 59 Tk more to prefer their wives to work.

Second, we remain agnostic about *why* individuals prefer (for example) their spouse working over themselves. Perhaps they value their spouse's time less than their own. Perhaps they are merely operating on inertia: having seen their spouse perform this task before, they defer to them now. Or perhaps they have indeed shifted deep-seated gender preferences over the course of the year. Regardless of why, the difference in these preferences across randomized groups can be attributable to the employment treatment alone, and it remains true that the average household in which a woman was briefly employed in the past exhibits stronger preferences for her employment today.

Finally, we note that the context a respondent anchors upon matters. We operate in a setting of ubiquitous unemployment: both husbands and wives have been largely unemployed for years. To shift from dual unemployment to a wife's employment may be a substantively different experience from shifting from a husband's employment to a wife's employment. We also note that our experiment does not test the impact of both individuals being employed. We refrain from this in order to keep income effects constant across treatment groups - both at the partner and individual level - and because aid organizations typically identify an individual, not a partnership, to be the beneficiary of cash or employment programs. Both dimensions suggest important avenues for future work.

6 Conclusion

Our study documents the significant psychosocial improvements that a six-week, part-time gainful employment program can impart on a highly vulnerable population in a setting where unemployment is pervasive. It finds that the psychosocial impacts of employment are roughly equivalent regardless of the sex of the employed beneficiary. However, when we consider the spillovers in psychosocial and IPV of employment on one's partner, we document a stark

asymmetry: the husbands of treated women exhibit no change in their wellbeing, but the wives of treated men exhibit substantial improvements in both their psychosocial wellbeing and their experience of abuse from their husbands. We find no evidence that these costs are in service of greater female agency in the household; nor do we find evidence that males retrench their power within households when they are employed. However, we observe labor supply preferences more than one year later that suggest that households *do* update their gender preferences based on their past experience. This suggests that preferences around labor roles may shift over time, even if the change is driven simply by familiarity or inertia, rather than changes in norms.

These results highlight the importance of accounting for spillover effects when evaluating the impacts of employment. These findings also influence how we model individuals' decisions to work (to account for the spillovers) and raise important questions about how to effectively target employment opportunities. In fact, the results present a complex trade-off for policymakers: households tend to feel happier and safer when the man works, but they are more likely to prefer that the woman work if she has had prior experience doing so. A key insight from this paper is the suggestion that, instead of requiring households to immediately choose one member for employment, organizations could allow both members to try working and then let the household decide based on the full set of impacts they experience, and the policy maker may not observe.

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Tables

Table 1: Time use, treated

	(1) Productive	(2) Sleep/Relax	(3) Idle
Work	2.313***	-2.316***	-0.561***
	(0.183)	(0.183)	(0.136)
Control Mean	11.164	12.767	3.714
Shrp. q-val Work	0.001	0.001	0.001
Observations	1043	1043	1042

Notes: Outcomes are measured in hours. (1) is the total amount of time in the previous day spent in productive activities, which includes income-generating work (including our work task), household chores, and actively taking care of household members or oneself. (2) is the total amount of time in the previous day spent sleeping or in leisure. (1) and (2) are derived from the same question block, which requires the respondent to give a time accounting for the past 24 hours. (3) is a separate question and directly asks the respondent the number of hours they spend sitting idle "in a usual day". Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: Financial portfolio, treated

	(1) Total Consumption	(2) Savings	(3) Borrowing	(4) Lending	(5) Can Spend 1000
Work	-8.5	568.1***	-667.4***	-0.3	13.2***
	(252.1)	(81.0)	(255.6)	(1.4)	(2.3)
Control Mean	4140.8	375.9	2479.3	5.2	73.9
Shrp. q-val Work	0.638	0.001	0.010	0.638	0.001
Observations	1043	986	1043	1043	1043

Notes: All outcomes are unstandardized; (1)-(3) are in Taka, and (4)-(5) in percentage points. (1) is the total amount of money the respondent has spent in the last two weeks. (2) is the total savings the respondent holds. (3) is the total amount the respondent is currently borrowing. (4) is whether the respondent currently has money lent to anyone. (5) is whether the respondent can currently cover an emergency expense of 1000 taka. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Psychosocial wellbeing, female-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Women	Individual Components of PS Index							
	(1) **PS Index**	(2) PHQ	(3) Stress	(4) Life Sat.	(5) Social	(6) Purpose	(7) Self-Worth	(8) Control	(9) Stability
Work	0.088**	0.203**	0.132	0.125*	-0.063	0.054	0.086	-0.036	0.108*
	(0.042)	(0.081)	(0.089)	(0.064)	(0.086)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.074)	(0.060)
Control Mean	0.047	0.033	0.026	0.034	0.133	0.061	0.070	0.020	0.036
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.112	0.239	0.203	0.389	0.389	0.366	0.452	0.203
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518

	Panel B: Partner Men	Individual Components of PS Index							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Work	-0.007	-0.012	0.004	-0.042	-0.000	0.068	0.016	-0.094	0.065
	(0.035)	(0.082)	(0.085)	(0.073)	(0.074)	(0.086)	(0.094)	(0.073)	(0.098)
Control Mean	0.027	-0.030	-0.026	0.069	0.058	0.013	0.020	0.040	-0.068
Shrp. q-val Work	-	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	505	505	505	505	505	505	505	505	505

Notes: All outcomes have been standardized against the respondent's gender. (2) is an index created from the nine-question PHQ-9 (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less depression). (3) is an index of three questions inspired by Cohen's Perceived Stress scale (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less stress). (4) is an index created from Diener's Satisfaction With Life Scale. (5) is how many people the respondent had conversations with yesterday. (6) is an index of the respondent's self rating of relative to the person who does the most in their family and community. (7) is similar to (6), but relative to the person who is respected the most. (8) is an index created from Levenson's Multidimensional Internal Locus of Control Scales. (9) is an index assessing stability by asking respondents how secure they feel at the moment and expect to feel in the future. The overall index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the previous seven outcomes. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Psychosocial wellbeing, male-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Men	Individual Components of PS Index							
	(1) **PS Index**	(2) PHQ	(3) Stress	(4) Life Sat.	(5) Social	(6) Purpose	(7) Self-Worth	(8) Control	(9) Stability
Work	0.112***	0.139*	0.094	0.127**	0.100*	0.141*	0.069	0.192***	-0.009
	(0.033)	(0.074)	(0.083)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.077)	(0.091)	(0.073)	(0.077)
Control Mean	-0.018	0.030	0.026	-0.069	-0.058	-0.013	-0.020	-0.040	0.068
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.135	0.191	0.135	0.157	0.135	0.240	0.076	0.520
Observations	525	525	524	524	524	524	524	524	524

	Panel B: Partner Women	Individual Components of PS Index							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Work	0.104**	0.200*	0.177*	0.056	-0.093	0.135**	0.198***	-0.010	0.154*
	(0.046)	(0.103)	(0.096)	(0.076)	(0.085)	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.092)
Control Mean	-0.043	-0.024	-0.029	-0.052	-0.134	-0.041	-0.058	0.004	-0.035
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.131	0.131	0.247	0.180	0.131	0.037	0.503	0.152
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518

Notes: All outcomes have been standardized against the respondent's gender. (2) is an index created from the nine-question PHQ-9 (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less depression). (3) is an index of three questions inspired by Cohen's Perceived Stress scale (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less stress). (4) is an index created from Diener's Satisfaction With Life Scale. (5) is how many people the respondent had conversations with yesterday. (6) is an index of the respondent's self rating of relative to the person who does the most in their family and community. (7) is similar to (6), but relative to the person who is respected the most. (8) is an index created from Levenson's Multidimensional Internal Locus of Control Scales. (9) is an index assessing stability by asking respondents how secure they feel at the moment and expect to feel in the future. The overall index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the previous seven outcomes. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Self-reported IPV, female-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Women	Components of IPV Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	IPV Index	Psych Abuse	Phys Abuse
Work	-0.070	-0.073	-0.066
	(0.071)	(0.095)	(0.075)
Control Mean	-0.010	-0.047	0.023
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.791	0.791
Observations	518	518	518

	Panel B: Partner Men
	Psych Abuse
Work	-0.069
	(0.081)
Control Mean	-0.022
Shrp. q-val Work	-
Observations	505

Notes: Outcomes in the negative direction indicate a decrease in IPV or its acceptability. All outcomes have been standardized against the respondent's gender. Outcomes lists differ by gender because we asked only a subset of questions to men. (2) is an index of the frequency of seven (four for men) psychological abuse IPV actions, including jealousy, humiliation, and insulting, with a higher score corresponding to higher frequency. (3) is an index of the frequency of one physical abuse action (not included for men) and two questions about the acceptability of physical violence against women. The overall index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of these two outcomes, computed only for women, because the physical abuse questions are asked only with respect to her experience. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Self-reported IPV, male-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Men
	Psych Abuse
Work	0.112
	(0.073)
Control Mean	0.022
Shrp. q-val Work	-
Observations	524

	Panel B: Partner Women	Components of IPV Index	
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	IPV Index	Psych Abuse	Phys Abuse
Work	-0.133*	-0.109	-0.158*
	(0.073)	(0.090)	(0.084)
Control Mean	0.013	0.052	-0.024
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.138	0.138
Observations	518	518	518

Notes: Outcomes in the negative direction indicate a decrease in IPV or its acceptability. All outcomes have been standardized against the respondent's gender. Outcomes lists differ by gender because we asked only a subset of questions to men. (2) is an index of the frequency of seven (four for men) psychological abuse IPV actions, including jealousy, humiliation, and insulting, with a higher score corresponding to higher frequency. (3) is an index of the frequency of one physical abuse action (not included for men) and two questions about the acceptability of physical violence against women. The overall index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of these two outcomes, computed only for women, because the physical abuse questions are asked only with respect to her experience. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 7: Household bargaining, female-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Women						
	(1) Barg Participate	(2) Barg Success	(3) Act Infl	(4) Act Deci	(5) Norm Action	(6) Norm Men HH	(7) Norm Women Work
Work	0.010	0.043	-0.008	0.007	-0.024	0.058	0.057
	(0.035)	(0.046)	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.062)	(0.060)	(0.057)
Control Mean	0.689	0.696	0.016	0.087	0.064	-0.032	-0.018
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	499	500	518	518	518	518	518

	Panel B: Partner Men					
	Barg Success	Act Infl	Act Deci	Norm Action	Norm Men HH	Norm Women Work
Work	0.045	-0.063	-0.089	-0.053	0.110	0.051
	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.086)	(0.055)
Control Mean	0.753	-0.017	0.034	0.027	-0.090	0.034
Shrp. q-val Work	0.539	0.539	0.539	0.539	0.539	0.539
Observations	502	505	505	505	505	505

Notes: Columns (3)-(7) are standardized. (1) is an indicator of whether the wife participated during the bargaining game. (2) is an indicator of whether the respondent received at least the amount they privately wanted. (3) is an index of how much ability the respondent has to influence their partner in case of disagreement. (4) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of (a) an index of who decides how much to spend on a set of five item types, (b) an index of what percentage of the household's budget they can spend, and (c) an index of who decides who performs a set of four time use categories. A higher index value means that the *respondent* holds greater sway over decision-making. (5) is similar to (4), but of who *should* decide how to spend or do, and how much. (6) is an index of level of disagreement with the statements "A husband who helps his wife with the household chores should not be respected" and "A husband who makes important decisions jointly with his wife is weak". (7) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of hours women should be allowed to work in/outside the block and level of disagreement with the statement "A wife who prioritizes work outside the home over household-chores is not a good wife". Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 8: Household bargaining, male-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Men					
	Barg Success	Act Infl	Act Deci	Norm Action	Norm Men HH	Norm Women Work
Work	-0.008	-0.124**	0.024	0.037	-0.106	0.059
	(0.038)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.078)	(0.071)
Control Mean	0.786	0.017	-0.034	-0.027	0.090	-0.034
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	0.174	1.000	1.000	0.769	1.000
Observations	517	524	524	524	524	525

	Panel B: Partner Women						
	(1) Barg Participate	(2) Barg Success	(3) Act Infl	(4) Act Deci	(5) Norm Action	(6) Norm Men HH	(7) Norm Women Work
Work	-0.010	-0.043	-0.029	-0.093**	-0.080	-0.009	-0.021
	(0.032)	(0.042)	(0.063)	(0.045)	(0.056)	(0.070)	(0.049)
Control Mean	0.680	0.728	-0.015	-0.522	-0.077	0.023	0.029
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.378	0.878	1.000	1.000
Observations	515	515	518	518	518	518	518

Notes: Columns (3)-(7) are standardized. (1) is an indicator of whether the wife participated during the bargaining game. (2) is an indicator of whether the respondent received at least the amount they privately wanted. (3) is an index of how much ability the respondent has to influence their partner in case of disagreement. (4) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of (a) an index of who decides how much to spend on a set of five item types, (b) an index of what percentage of the household's budget they can spend, and (c) an index of who decides who performs a set of four time use categories. A higher index value means that the *respondent* holds greater sway over decision-making. (5) is similar to (4), but of who *should* decide how to spend or do, and how much. (6) is an index of level of disagreement with the statements "A husband who helps his wife with the household chores should not be respected" and "A husband who makes important decisions jointly with his wife is weak". (7) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of hours women should be allowed to work in/outside the block and level of disagreement with the statement "A wife who prioritizes work outside the home over household-chores is not a good wife". Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 9: Aspirations for children, female-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Women			
	Eldest Daughter	Eldest Son	Daughter-in-Law	Son-in-Law
Work	0.021	-0.001	0.172**	-0.067
	(0.077)	(0.081)	(0.069)	(0.072)
Control Mean	0.061	0.032	-0.542	-0.446
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	0.027	0.211
Observations	518	518	518	518

	Panel B: Partner Men			
	(1) Eldest Daughter	(2) Eldest Son	(3) Daughter-in-Law	(4) Son-in-Law
Work	0.317***	-0.070	-0.105*	-0.105
	(0.091)	(0.079)	(0.063)	(0.069)
Control Mean	-0.096	-0.051	-0.618	-0.600
Shrp. q-val Work	0.002	0.231	0.146	0.146
Observations	505	505	505	505

Notes: All outcomes have been standardized. (1) is the preferred level of education for the oldest daughter. (2) is preferred level of education for the oldest son. The raw score for (1) and (2) are as follows: 0 for no education, 1 for Grades 1-5, religious or vocational education, 2 for Grades 6-10, 3 for Grades 11-12, and 4 for university or higher. (3) is preference for a daughter-in-law who wishes to work outside the home. (4) is preference for a son-in-law who allows his wife to work outside the home. The raw score for (3) and (4) are as follows: -1 for less working freedom for the woman, 0 for no preference, and 1 for more working freedom. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 10: Aspirations for children, male-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Men			
	(1) Eldest Daughter	(2) Eldest Son	(3) Daughter-in-Law	(4) Son-in-Law
Work	-0.050	-0.155*	-0.014	-0.046
	(0.094)	(0.080)	(0.045)	(0.051)
Control Mean	0.096	0.051	-0.594	-0.588
Shrp. q-val Work	0.423	0.123	1.000	1.000
Observations	524	524	524	524

	Panel B: Partner Women			
	(1) Eldest Daughter	(2) Eldest Son	(3) Daughter-in-Law	(4) Son-in-Law
Work	0.153*	0.157*	0.023	0.160**
	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.067)	(0.067)
Control Mean	-0.049	-0.017	-0.524	-0.518
Shrp. q-val Work	0.083	0.083	0.585	0.036
Observations	518	518	518	518

Notes: All outcomes have been standardized. (1) is the preferred level of education for the oldest daughter. (2) is preferred level of education for the oldest son. The raw score for (1) and (2) are as follows: 0 for no education, 1 for Grades 1-5, religious or vocational education, 2 for Grades 6-10, 3 for Grades 11-12, and 4 for university or higher. (3) is preference for a daughter-in-law who wishes to work outside the home. (4) is preference for a son-in-law who allows his wife to work outside the home. The raw score for (3) and (4) are as follows: -1 for less working freedom for the woman, 0 for no preference, and 1 for more working freedom. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 11: Labor supply: preference for woman to work

	Panel A: Women	
	(1)	(2)
	Pref. Women	Value of Woman Working
Woman Assigned Work	17.9**	133.0***
	(7.2)	(30.0)
Man Assigned Work Mean	62.7	12.5
Shrp. q-val	0.007	0.001
Observations	188	188

	Panel B: Men	
	(1)	(2)
	Pref. Women	Value of Woman Working
Woman Assigned Work	23.9***	181.4***
	(8.7)	(48.4)
Man Assigned Work Mean	25.0	-126.2
Shrp. q-val	0.004	0.001
Observations	194	194

Notes: Outcomes are unstandardized. (1) is the proportion (in percentage points) of respondents that prefer the woman to work at parity (200 Tk/day). (2) is a measure of the strength of this preference; how much additional daily wage would be required for the man to work. For example, if a respondent prefers the woman to work at a wage of 200 Tk and would require 300 Tk to switch to the man working, we define the value placed on the woman working as +100Tk. Conversely, if the respondent prefers the man to work at a wage of 200 Tk and would require 300 Tk for the woman to work, we define the value placed on the woman working as -100 Tk. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figures

Figure 1: Work task worksheets

(a) Female



(b) Male

Notes: This figure presents the time sheets provided to the women (Panel A) and men (Panel B) who were randomized into the employment intervention. Each individual received four identical sheets per work day, with the time of day they were intended to be completed pre-filled on the top right, and space to put tally marks below each picture. Each sheet includes an exhaustive pictorial list of the activities one might be engaged in within the camps. For women, from top left to bottom right: being idle, praying in the tent, coking in the tent, caring for children, sowing in a women's center, cooking in a cooking center, spending time with friends or family, washing clothes or bathing, going to the market, fetching water, fetching firewood, waiting in line for rations, or napping. For men, from top left to bottom right: being idle, sitting in a tea stall, bathing, going to the market, napping, doing agricultural labor, praying at the mosque, doing construction labor, waiting in line for rations, eating, or feeding children/spending time with children.

Figure 2: Task completion



Notes: This figure shows task completion rates for men and women in our sample. Visit number 1 is missing because the respondents received their assinged treatment status at that meeting; they had not yet completed any work at that point.

The Impact of Employment on Partnerships: Evidence From a Refugee Settlement

Online appendix

Yueh-ya Hsu, Reshmaan Hussam, Erin Kelley, and Greg Lane

Contents

A Appendix Tables and Figures

A.1 Tables

A.1.1 Descriptives

Table A1: Descriptives, baseline

	(1) Men	(2) Women	(3) All
Age	31.70	28.16	29.94
People in Household	5.44	5.45	5.44
Children (18-) in Household	3.21	3.21	3.21
Formally Educated	0.39	0.24	0.32
Religious Education	0.40	0.63	0.52
Prev. Agricultural Work	0.40	0.00	0.20
Work in Last 30 Days	0.15	0.01	0.08
Worked in Myanmar	0.66	0.01	0.34
Healthy Days in last 30	26.35	23.65	25.00
Moderately or Severely Depressed	0.18	0.22	0.20
Savings (BDT)	360.91	240.84	300.26
Consumption in Last 2 Weeks (BDT)	3960.12	3497.19	3728.98
Observations	1080	1077	2157

Notes: This table includes data for all individuals surveyed at baseline, whether treated or partner. Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the average value of the variable for men, women, and everyone, respectively.

Table A2: Time use, baseline

	(1) Men	(2) Women
Sleeping	8.0	8.0
Daily Wage	0.0	0.0
Self-Employment	0.0	0.0
Chores Inside House	3.0	3.0
Chores Outside House	2.0	3.0
Caring for Family	2.0	3.0
Caring for Self	2.0	2.0
Relaxing	5.0	3.0
Observations	1080	1077

Notes: This table includes data for all individuals surveyed at baseline, whether treated or partner. Columns (1), (2), and (3) show the **median** value of the variable for men, and women, respectively.

A.1.2 Balance

Table A3: Balance in observables across treatment arms

	(1) Control	(2) Work	(3) (1) vs. (2)
Age	29.69	30.10	0.23
People in HH	5.40	5.45	0.94
Pct. Formal Educ.	0.37	0.29	0.02
Math Literacy Index	-0.00	-0.05	0.21
Digit Span Index	-0.00	-0.04	0.43
Life Satisfaction Index	-0.00	-0.11	0.09
Self-Worth Index	0.00	0.12	0.52
Purpose Index	-0.00	0.11	0.87
Work Last 30 Days	0.08	0.07	0.69
Worked Myanmar	0.33	0.33	0.69
Hrs Idle/Day	3.94	3.98	0.49
Locus of Control	15.04	14.90	0.58
Healthy Days	24.84	25.32	0.04
PHQ Index	0.00	0.05	0.62
Stress Index	0.00	0.02	0.53
Diff. Conversations	12.56	12.55	0.80
Savings (BDT)	276.73	251.44	0.93
Consumption 2 Wks (BDT)	3710.52	3645.39	0.84
IPV Verbal Index	0.00	0.08	0.27
IPV Norms Index	-0.00	-0.10	0.05
Men in Home Norms Index	0.00	-0.16	0.00
Women at Work Norms Index	-0.00	0.05	0.45
Aspirations for Working Daughter Index	-0.00	-0.00	0.99
Observations	360	720	
Joint F-Test			0.17

Notes: Columns (1) and (2) show the average value of the variable in the respective treatment arm, for individuals who received the treatment. Indices are standardized. Column (3) shows the p-value of the difference in means between the control and work treatment groups.

A.1.3 Attrition

Table A4: Attrition, endline survey

	(1) Treatment	(2) Partner	(3) Male	(4) Female
Work	0.002	-0.008	-0.010	0.005
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Mean in Control	0.033	0.056	0.053	0.036
Observations	1080	1080	1080	1080

Notes: This table reports attrition for the endline survey in the treatment arm relative to control. The four columns are different sub-samples: Column (1) reports attrition for treated individuals (both men and women). Column (2) reports attrition for their partners. Column (3) reports attrition of male respondents (both treated and partner). Column (4) reports attrition for female respondents. Standard errors are clustered at the camp level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A.1.4 First Stage

Table A5: Time use components, female-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Women							
	(1) Sleeping	(2) Daily Wage	(3) Self-employed	(4) Chores Outside	(5) Chores Inside	(6) Care Family	(7) Care Self	(8) Relaxing
Work	-0.903***	4.677***	-0.035	-0.583***	-0.690***	-0.647***	-0.565***	-1.269***
	(0.103)	(0.278)	(0.087)	(0.072)	(0.079)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.160)
Control Mean	8.023	0.164	0.508	2.887	3.124	2.989	2.299	4.006
Shrp. q-val Work	0.001	0.001	0.094	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518
	Panel B: Partner Men							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Work	-0.026	-0.354*	-0.001	0.066	-0.003	0.003	0.074	0.252
	(0.114)	(0.207)	(0.086)	(0.082)	(0.069)	(0.082)	(0.061)	(0.158)
Control Mean	8.124	1.406	0.882	2.506	1.571	2.379	1.776	5.356
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	0.792	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.828	0.792
Observations	505	505	505	505	505	505	505	505

Notes: We ask about the number of hours that respondents engage in the following activities: (1) Sleeping; (2) Income generating work specific to daily/regular wage; (3) Self-employed income generating work; (4) Household chores/unpaid work outside the house; (5) Household chores/unpaid work inside the house; (6) Actively taking care of sick/elderly/children; (7) Actively taking care of oneself; (8) Relaxing/leisure. All outcomes are in hours. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Time use components, male-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Men							
	(1) Sleeping	(2) Daily Wage	(3) Self-employed	(4) Chores Outside	(5) Chores Inside	(6) Care Family	(7) Care Self	(8) Relaxing
Work	-0.621***	4.219***	-0.274***	-0.420***	-0.157*	-0.434***	-0.467***	-1.828***
	(0.111)	(0.321)	(0.076)	(0.084)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.055)	(0.189)
Control Mean	8.147	0.929	0.776	2.579	1.624	2.474	2.006	5.465
Shrp. q-val Work	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.011	0.001	0.001	0.001
Observations	524	524	524	524	524	524	524	524

	Panel B: Partner Women							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Work	-0.357***	0.057	-0.029	-0.123	0.067	-0.013	0.043	0.320**
	(0.123)	(0.053)	(0.081)	(0.077)	(0.065)	(0.064)	(0.070)	(0.149)
Control Mean	8.335	0.218	0.529	2.853	3.071	2.871	2.253	3.871
Shrp. q-val Work	0.032	0.440	0.955	0.279	0.440	0.955	0.809	0.129
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518

Notes: We ask about the number of hours that respondents engage in the following activities: (1) Sleeping; (2) Income generating work specific to daily/regular wage; (3) Self-employed income generating work; (4) Household chores/unpaid work outside the house; (5) Household chores/unpaid work inside the house; (6) Actively taking care of sick/elderly/children; (7) Actively taking care of oneself; (8) Relaxing/leisure. All outcomes are in hours. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A7: Financial portfolio, female-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Women				
	(1) Total Consumption	(2) Savings	(3) Borrowing	(4) Lending	(5) Can Spend 1000
Work	132.961	633.656***	-956.081***	0.007	0.167***
	(299.615)	(80.318)	(303.058)	(0.015)	(0.038)
Control Mean	3833.531	166.800	2285.876	0.028	0.706
Shrp. q-val Work	0.357	0.001	0.002	0.357	0.001
Observations	518	494	518	518	518

	Panel B: Partner Men				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Work	-92.650	418.328***	-1066.551***	0.018	0.071**
	(301.539)	(75.273)	(358.945)	(0.018)	(0.032)
Control Mean	4482.576	422.976	3345.176	0.029	0.759
Shrp. q-val Work	0.436	0.001	0.007	0.186	0.029
Observations	505	469	505	505	505

Notes: All outcomes are unstandardized; (1)-(3) are in taka, and (4)-(5) in percentage points. (1) is the total amount of money the respondent has spent in the last two weeks. (2) is the total savings the respondent holds. (3) is the total amount the respondent is currently borrowing. (4) is whether the respondent currently has money lent to anyone. (5) is whether the respondent can currently cover an emergency expense of 1000 taka. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Financial portfolio, male-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Men				
	(1) Total Consumption	(2) Savings	(3) Borrowing	(4) Lending	(5) Can Spend 1000
Work	-139.538	511.670***	-390.823	-0.014	0.099***
	(331.227)	(110.683)	(346.569)	(0.023)	(0.032)
Control Mean	4458.772	591.176	2679.532	0.076	0.772
Shrp. q-val Work	0.679	0.001	0.352	0.671	0.004
Observations	525	492	525	525	525
	Panel B: Partner Women				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Work	27.942	305.342***	-133.389	0.041***	0.128***
	(278.665)	(96.031)	(254.314)	(0.014)	(0.041)
Control Mean	3810.947	286.310	1745.882	0.018	0.747
Shrp. q-val Work	0.583	0.005	0.429	0.005	0.005
Observations	518.000	494.000	518.000	518.000	518.000

Notes: All outcomes are unstandardized; (1)-(3) are in taka, and (4)-(5) in percentage points. (1) is the total amount of money the respondent has spent in the last two weeks. (2) is the total savings the respondent holds. (3) is the total amount the respondent is currently borrowing. (4) is whether the respondent currently has money lent to anyone. (5) is whether the respondent can currently cover an emergency expense of 1000 taka. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A.1.5 Consumption

Table A9: Selected consumption components, female-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Women						
	(1) Better Food	(2) Paan	(3) Education	(4) Heathcare	(5) Give Loans	(6) Festivals	(7) Small HH
Work	82.889	63.007**	14.950	36.906	50.060	-96.079	0.702
	(77.973)	(30.558)	(15.098)	(76.414)	(61.498)	(88.520)	(11.831)
Control Mean	1525.085	431.441	126.789	828.192	94.914	305.148	130.554
Shrp. q-val Work	0.938	0.386	0.938	1.000	0.997	0.938	1.000
Observations	516	517	501	515	498	498	513
	Panel B: Partner Men						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Work	45.659	-18.821	-24.235	-78.544	17.686	70.088	-0.118
	(79.185)	(27.984)	(16.615)	(82.107)	(52.341)	(149.985)	(11.586)
Control Mean	1671.635	578.894	146.746	849.500	165.704	365.976	171.382
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	505	505	488	500	484	490	497

Notes: All outcomes are in taka and unstandardized. Each column representst the amount of money spent on a particular consumption category: (1) Food (meat, fish, fruits, vegetables); (2) Paan (paan, cigarettes, tea and coffee); (3) education; (4) healthcare; (5) giving loans; (6) festivals/dawat (eid, funeral, wedding, ear piercing); (7) bribes/extorsion; (8) small/regular (non-food) household expenditures (phone bill, mosquito nets, kitchen materials); (9) ...large household expenditures (home improvement, furniture). Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A10: Selected consumption components, male-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Men						
	(1) Better Food	(2) Paan	(3) Education	(4) Heathcare	(5) Give Loans	(6) Festivals	(7) Small HH
Work	1.134	-4.237	30.084*	8.423	16.324	-109.247	3.067
	(70.884)	(30.050)	(16.342)	(98.999)	(37.500)	(144.208)	(11.296)
Control Mean	1678.830	553.392	87.895	768.047	66.830	476.520	169.673
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	0.865	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	524	525	508	516	506	508	519
	Panel B: Partner Women						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Work	-69.677	37.637	16.362	32.026	-40.217	-69.064	1.504
	(58.405)	(28.367)	(16.654)	(70.130)	(46.409)	(116.119)	(12.656)
Control Mean	1597.235	426.706	104.793	733.471	152.530	314.012	124.888
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	514	515	498	515	505	500	512

Notes: All outcomes are in taka and unstandardized. Each column representst the amount of money spent on a particular consumption category: (1) Food (meat, fish, fruits, vegetables); (2) Paan, cigarettes, tea and coffee; (3) education; (4) healthcare; (5) giving loans; (6) festivals/dawat (eid, funeral, wedding, ear piercing); (7) bribes/extorsion; (8) small/regular (non-food) household expenditures (phone bill, mosquito nets, kitchen materials); (9) large household expenditures (home improvement, furniture). Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A.1.6 IPV Components

Table A11: Self-reported IPV components, female-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Women									
	Verbal							Physical		
	(1) Jealous	(2) No Money	(3) Humiliate	(4) Insult	(5) Unfaithful	(6) No Friends	(7) No Family	(8) Threaten	(9) Tolerate Beating	(10) Right to Beat
Work	0.020	-0.035	-0.045	-0.020	-0.073*	-0.109**	-0.045	-0.028	-0.013	-0.012
	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Control Mean	0.734	0.186	0.424	0.294	0.277	0.350	0.215	0.181	0.864	0.814
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.378	0.125	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518

	Panel B: Partner Men			
	Verbal			
	(1) Jealous	(2) No Money	(3) Humiliate	(4) Insult
Work	0.031	0.027	-0.053	-0.101**
	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Control Mean	0.665	0.276	0.294	0.424
Shrp. q-val Work	0.497	0.497	0.385	0.048
Observations	505	505	505	505

Notes: This table presents the effects for each question in the IPV module. Respondents were asked how often the following occurred in the past month: Their partner became jealous or angry when they talked to others (Column 1); Their partner did not trust them with any money (Column 2); Their partner said or did something to humiliate them in front of others (Column 3); Their partner insulted them or made them feel bad about themselves (Column 4); Their partner accused them of being unfaithful (Column 5); Their partner did not allow them to meet with same-gender friends (Column 6); Their partner tried to limit their contact with family (Column 7); Their partner threatened to harm them or someone close to them (Column 8). Additionally, respondents were asked how often they believe: A wife should tolerate being beaten by her husband to keep the family together (Column 9); A husband should have the right to beat his wife (Column 10). All outcomes have been converted into binary variables for ease of interpretation, where a value of 1 indicates *any* occurrence in the past month (actions) or any acceptability (norms). Outcomes lists differ by gender because we asked only a subset of questions to men. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A12: Self-reported IPV components, male-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Men			
	Verbal			
	(1) Jealous	(2) No Money	(3) Humiliate	(4) Insult
Work	0.135***	0.026	-0.021	0.001
	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.042)	(0.042)
Control Mean	0.629	0.353	0.359	0.412
Shrp. q-val Work	0.002	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	524	524	524	524

	Panel B: Partner Women									
	Verbal							Physical		
	(1) Jealous	(2) No Money	(3) Humiliate	(4) Insult	(5) Unfaithful	(6) No Friends	(7) No Family	(8) Threaten	(9) Tolerate Beating	(10) Right to Beat
Work	-0.028	-0.054	-0.072	-0.061	-0.025	-0.084**	-0.055	-0.063*	-0.050*	-0.010
	(0.036)	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.037)
Control Mean	0.753	0.253	0.500	0.359	0.247	0.359	0.241	0.212	0.859	0.753
Shrp. q-val Work	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.307	0.427
Observations	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518

Notes: This table presents the effects for each question in the IPV module. Respondents were asked how often the following occurred in the past month: Their partner became jealous or angry when they talked to others (Column 1); Their partner did not trust them with any money (Column 2); Their partner said or did something to humiliate them in front of others (Column 3); Their partner insulted them or made them feel bad about themselves (Column 4); Their partner accused them of being unfaithful (Column 5); Their partner did not allow them to meet with same-gender friends (Column 6); Their partner tried to limit their contact with family (Column 7); Their partner threatened to harm them or someone close to them (Column 8). Additionally, respondents were asked how often they believe: A wife should tolerate being beaten by her husband to keep the family together (Column 9); A husband should have the right to beat his wife (Column 10). All outcomes have been converted into binary variables for ease of interpretation, where a value of 1 indicates *any* occurrence in the past month (actions) or any acceptability (norms). Outcomes lists differ by gender because we asked only a subset of questions to men. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A.1.7 Labor Supply Exercise

Table A13: Labor supply: preference for woman to work for 6 months

	Panel A: Women	
	(1) Pref. Women	(2) Value of Woman Working
Woman Assigned Work	0.168***	61.889**
	(0.047)	(28.265)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.764	80.085
Shrp. q-val	0.001	0.016
Observations	190	190

	Panel B: Men	
	(1) Pref. Women	(2) Value of Woman Working
Woman Assigned Work	0.040	61.967*
	(0.072)	(33.423)
Man Assigned Work Mean	0.231	-120.067
Shrp. q-val	0.409	0.151
Observations	183	183

Notes: Outcomes are unstandardized. (1) is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when the respondent prefers the woman of the household to work at parity (200 Tk/day). (2) is a measure of the strength of this preference; how much additional daily wage would be required for the man to work. For example, if a respondent prefers the woman to work at a wage of 200 Tk and would require 300 Tk to switch to the man working, we define the value placed on the woman working as +100Tk. Conversely, if the respondent prefers the man to work at a wage of 200 Tk and would require 300 Tk for the woman to work, we define the value placed on the woman working as -100 Tk. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

B Details on outcome measures

Outcome Variable Descriptions

Psychological Well-being	
PHQ9	The standardized total score of 9 questions from the Patient Health Questionnaire-9 (PHQ9). Inversely coded so a higher score indicates less depression.
Locus of Control	The standardized total score from responses to four locus of control questions (Levenson's Scales). "In the last 7 days, how many days did you feel that to a great extent your life is controlled by accidental/chance happenings..."
Life Satisfaction Index	A standardized average of survey responses to four questions from Diener's standardized scale, responses made along a six-point Likert scale.
Stress Index	The standardized total score from three elements of adapted from the Cohen Stress scale. "How many of the last 7 days have you [been able to fall asleep peacefully / felt nervous / felt frustrated]?". Inversely coded so a higher score indicates less stress.
Sociability	The number of conversations with other adults in the previous day.
Stability Index	The standardized total score from responses to two stability questions using a Cantril ladder. "How secure [do you feel / think you will feel] [at present / five years from now]"
Purpose	Index of the respondent's self rating of relative to the person who *does the most* in their family and community (as in Hussam et al. (2022)).
Self-Worth	Index of the respondent's self rating of relative to the person who is *respected the most* in their family and community (as in Hussam et al. (2022)).
Intimate Partner Violence	
Psychological Abuse	Index of the frequency of seven (four for men) psychological abuse IPV actions, including jealousy, humiliation, and insulting, with a higher score corresponding to higher frequency. See Table A12 notes for exact questions
Physical Abuse	Index of (a) the frequency of threatened physical abuse and (b) two questions about whether physical abuse should be tolerated/is justified (How often should a wife tolerate being beaten by her husband in order to keep the family together; How often should a husband have the right to beat his wife)
Bargaining and Norms	
Bargaining: Wife Participated	Bargaining game: Wife participated in decision making process (binary)
Bargaining: Success	Bargaining game: Received at least desired bargaining amount (binary)

Actions: Influence Index	Inverse covariance weighted index of (a) how often the spouse takes the respondent's input into consideration, how often the respondent expresses their disagreement, how often the respondent tries to change their spouse's mind, and how often the respondent changes their mind in response, and (b) who makes the final decision in case of disagreement.
Actions: Decision Index	Inverse covariance weighted sum of (a) an index of who decides how much to spend on a set of five item types (small/large household purchases, child, health, and luxury), (b) an index of what percentage of the household's monthly budget they can spend, and (c) an index of who decides who performs a set of four time use categories (such as raising children). A higher index value means that the respondent holds greater sway over decision-making.
Norms: Actions	Inverse covariance weighted sum of (a) an index of who should decide how much to spend, (b) an index of what percentage of the household's monthly budget they should be able to spend, and (c) an index of who should decide who should do the task. A higher index value means that the respondent believes they should hold greater sway over decision-making.
Norms: Men in Household	Index of level of disagreement with the statements "A husband who helps his wife with the household chores should not be respected" and "A husband who makes important decisions jointly with his wife is weak".
Norms: Women at Work	Inverse covariance weighted sum of hours women should be allowed to work in/outside the block, level of disagreement with the statement "A wife who prioritizes work outside the home over household-chores is not a good wife".
Aspirations for Children	
Eldest Daughter	Preferred level of education for the oldest daughter. Raw score: 0 for no education, 1 for Grades 1-5, religious or vocational education, 2 for Grades 6-10, 3 for Grades 11-12, and 4 for university or higher.
Eldest Son	Preferred level of education for the oldest son, with scoring as above.
Daughter-in-law	Preference for daughter-in-law who wishes to work outside the home. Raw score: -1 for a daughter-in-law who does not want to work, 1 for one who does, and 0 for no preference.
Son-in-law	Preference for son-in-law who allows his wife to work outside the home, with scoring as above.
Disaggregated Consumption	
Better Food	In the last 2 weeks, how much did you spend on daily groceries (rice, lentils, oil)?
Paan	...paan, cigarettes, tea and coffee?
Education	...education (private tutor)?

Healthcare	...healthcare?
Give Loans	...giving loans?
Festivals	...festivals/dawat (eid, funeral, wedding, ear piercing)?
Small Household	...small/regular (non-food) household expenditures (phone bill, mosquito nets, kitchen materials)?
Other Outcomes	
Days Healthy	Number of days not sick in the past 30 days
Cognitive Ability	A standardized weighted index of the number of correct responses to i) a digit span (forward and backward) memory test and ii) basic arithmetic problems including addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.
Risk Tolerance	Button "gambling" game: 10 minus the button level reached, so that a higher value indicates greater risk tolerance.
Labor Supply Exercise	
Preference for Women	Indicator with value 1 when the respondent prefers that the woman of the household works at parity (200 taka/day).
Value of Woman Working	Additional daily wage required for the man to work. For example, if the respondent only prefers that the man work at 300 Tk (when the woman makes 200 Tk), the value of a woman working is +100 Tk. A negative wage premium indicates that the respondent prefers the man to work.

C Deviations from Pre-Analysis Plan (PAP)

Below we note the deviations in the analysis from the PAP; available here.

C.1 Sample and Specification

- To focus our exposition on *employment's* impact on the lives of those closest to the employed, we include only work treatment and control groups. This lowers our sample to 1080 households across 120 sub-blocks. The estimating question is updated accordingly. We report outcomes for the cash and volunteer arms in the companion paper (Hsu et al., 2025).

- We report results separately for each sub-group of respondents (treated men, treated women, partner men, partner women), rather than run a pooled regression with interactions. We chose this presentation for ease of comparison across four groups. Formal tests of equality between coefficients are still done via interactions with p-values reported in text.

C.2 Main Outcomes

- **Psychosocial wellbeing:** We expand our psychosocial wellbeing index by including three dimensions listed as mechanisms in our PAP: **purpose**, **self-worth**, and **sociability**. We limit the definition of sociability to only the measure of how many people the respondent had a conversation with yesterday. We made this change to ensure our psychosocial index was inline with (and directly comparable to) our previous work Hussam et al. (2022).

- **IPV**: We report an additional index of intimate partner violence as another main outcome. This includes the pre-specified IPV measures listed in the PAP.

- **Household Power Dynamic:** We re-organize several mechanisms under a discussion of household power dynamics. This includes the pre-specified questions from the incentivized **household bargaining** game.

  - It also includes the pre-specified questions which we refer to in the paper as "actions": 1) the ability to **influence** one's spouse in case of disagreement, 2) intra-household **decision making** about consumption and time use decision-making.

    - We combine decision-making over consumption and time-use in a single index rather than leaving them disaggregated (for ease of presentation - there is no movement along this margin).
  - It also includes the pre-specified questions which we refer to in the paper as **"norms"**: 1) beliefs around **who should** make decisions about consumption and time use; 2) norms around **men in the household**; and 3) norms around **women in the workplace**.
    - We combine beliefs about who should make decision-making over consumption and time-use into a single index (for ease of presentation - there is no movement along this margin).
    - From the norms around women in the workplace: to avoid "double counting" we no longer consider the pre-specified questions about one's preference for a son-in-law (daughter-in-law) that allows one's daughter (son) to work to be a reflection of norms of women's work. Rather we present them in the aspirations for children section.

- **Aspirations for Children:** We re-organize another set of policy-relevant variables under the heading **aspirations for children**. This includes the pre-specified questions about one's preference for a son-in-law (daughter-in-law) that allows one's daughter (son) to work. We also include two new variables about the highest level of educational attainment that one desires for their eldest daughter (son) that were included in the survey (time-stamped and public) but that we forgot to mention in the pre-analysis plan.

- **Labor Supply** To investigate the asymmetric nature of the spillover effects in our main outcomes, we returned to our study setting 15 months after the original treatment period. In households that received the work treatment, we used an incentivized choice experiment to reveal respondents' preferences for whether the husband or wife should work.

C.3 Pre-specify outcomes no longer in the main paper

- The following outcomes are no longer in the main text. We provide justifications for these decisions in what follows, and present the associated tables in the next section.

- While we pre-specified **physical wellbeing** (in the form of sick days in the past month), **cognitive ability** (through a digit span and arithmetic test), and **risk preferences** (through a risk-elicitation game) as dimensions of well-being, in retrospect

we do not think these outcomes belong together as measures of wellbeing. Instead, we think these outcomes are likely downstream of pyschosocial improvements (as discussed in Hussam et al. (2022)), therefore we do not report them in our main wellbeing analysis.

- We pre-specified a measure of beliefs (norms) around bargaining: "A wife who frequently expresses her opinion in the household is overbearing/talks too much." This question was not well understood (there was no adequate translation for the word "overbearing")

- We elicited their willingness to work for an additional week of work. Our findings align with those of Hussam et al. (2022), but we believe a more relevant measure of labor supply decisions—given the focus of this paper—comes from the 15-month follow-up. In this survey, we ask treated individuals *and* their partners about their willingness to accept work, providing deeper insight into their labor preferences.

- We specify a robustness check for one potential confound: participants in the work and volunteering arms may expect their work engagement to unlock other employment opportunities in the future. We replicate (Hussam et al., 2022) using a sub-experiment where we presented certificates of participation to a randomized half of our sample. As with (Hussam et al., 2022) we find no evidence of this confound.

- We tracked several variables through our weekly surveys, which we present below. However, since these surveys were not conducted with partners, they do not directly relate to the focus of this paper.

D Additional Pre-specified results

Table A15: Physical health, cognitive health and preferences, female-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Women		
	(1) Days Healthy	(2) Cognitive Index	(3) Risk Tol.
Work	0.037	0.053	-0.033
	(0.074)	(0.078)	(0.099)
Control Mean	0.049	-0.211	-0.013
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	518	518	518
	Panel B: Partner Men		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Work	-0.027	0.100	-0.092
	(0.106)	(0.067)	(0.097)
Control Mean	0.039	-0.097	-0.063
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	0.699	0.699
Observations	505	505	505

Notes: All outcomes have been standardized. (1) is the number of days not sick in the past 30 days. (2) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the digit memory game (sum of level reached) and the number of math questions answered correctly. (3) is the inverse (tolerance, instead of acceptance) of the level at which the respondent was willing to accept the risk game bet. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A16: Physical health, cognitive health and preferences, male-treated households

	Panel A: Treated Men		
	(1) Days Healthy	(2) Cognitive Index	(3) Risk Tol.
Work	0.146**	-0.159**	0.112
	(0.071)	(0.065)	(0.093)
Control Mean	-0.039	0.220	0.063
Shrp. q-val Work	0.048	0.048	0.084
Observations	524	524	524
	Panel B: Partner Women		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Work	0.056	0.031	0.020
	(0.097)	(0.074)	(0.096)
Control Mean	-0.040	-0.132	0.011
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	518	518	518

Notes: All outcomes have been standardized. (1) is the number of days not sick in the past 30 days. (2) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the digit memory game (sum of level reached) and the number of math questions answered correctly. (3) is the inverse (tolerance, instead of acceptance) of the level at which the respondent was willing to accept the risk game bet. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A17: Psychosocial wellbeing, pooled

	Panel A: Treated	Individual Components of PS Index							
	(1) **PS Index**	(2) PHQ	(3) Stress	(4) Life Sat.	(5) Social	(6) Purpose	(7) Self-Worth	(8) Control	(9) Stability
Work	0.092***	0.175***	0.098	0.121***	0.039	0.094*	0.066	0.075	0.054
	(0.030)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.053)
Control Mean	0.004	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.034	0.204	0.034	0.292	0.204	0.292	0.271	0.292
Observations	1043	1043	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042

	Panel B: Partner	Individual Components of PS Index							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Work	0.043	0.121*	0.102	0.006	-0.026	0.104*	0.117**	-0.047	0.118*
	(0.029)	(0.073)	(0.063)	(0.055)	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.056)	(0.053)	(0.064)
Control Mean	-0.020	-0.059	-0.049	0.015	-0.006	-0.041	-0.049	0.032	-0.102
Shrp. q-val Work	-	0.210	0.210	0.525	0.317	0.210	0.210	0.230	0.210
Observations	1023	1023	1023	1023	1023	1023	1023	1023	1023

Notes: All outcomes have been standardized against the respondent's gender. (2) is an index created from the nine-question PHQ-9 (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less depression). (3) is an index of three questions inspired by Cohen's Perceived Stress scale (inversely coded so a higher score indicates less stress). (4) is an index created from Diener's Satisfaction With Life Scale. (5) is how many people the respondent had conversations with yesterday. (6) is an index of the respondent's self rating of relative to the person who does the most in their family and community. (7) is similar to (6), but relative to the person who is respected the most. (8) is an index created from Levenson's Multidimensional Internal Locus of Control Scales. (9) is an index assessing stability by asking respondents how secure they feel at the moment and expect to feel in the future. The overall index (1) is an inverse covariance weighted sum of the previous seven outcomes. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A18: Psychosocial index, heterogeneity by participation certificate

		Individual Components of PS Index							
	(1) **PS Index**	(2) PHQ	(3) Stress	(4) Life Sat.	(5) Social	(6) Purpose	(7) Self-Worth	(8) Control	(9) Stability
Work	0.087**	0.153*	0.028	0.132**	0.077	0.054	0.005	0.045	0.138**
	(0.041)	(0.091)	(0.087)	(0.065)	(0.055)	(0.074)	(0.071)	(0.080)	(0.067)
Work x Got Certificate	0.004	0.035	0.142	-0.023	-0.094	0.086	0.135	0.044	-0.183*
	(0.058)	(0.127)	(0.127)	(0.091)	(0.080)	(0.113)	(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.108)
Got Certificate	0.039	0.051	-0.071	0.014	0.171***	-0.074	-0.141	0.094	0.180**
	(0.052)	(0.113)	(0.102)	(0.074)	(0.064)	(0.093)	(0.087)	(0.086)	(0.087)
Control Mean	0.004	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000
Shrp. q-val Work	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Observations	1043	1043	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042	1042

Notes: This table reports the treatment effect of receiving employment and receiving a certificate (and the interaction) – which we investigate as a robusntess check. Regressions include camp and enumerator fixed effects, controls selected by lasso, and the baseline value of the outcome variable. Standard errors are clustered at the block level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure A1: Labor supply curve, by gender



Notes: This figure presents the cumulative distribution function of the reservation wage expressed by employment treatment participants for an additional week of work using the incentivized Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. The horizontal axis is in units of Bangladeshi Taka. The vertical dotted line represents the point at which individuals express a willingness to work one additional week for zero pay. Negative reservation wages are a measure of how much respondents are willing to forego earning in an alternative (minimal effort) task in order to continue working for one week with no pay.

Figure A2: Weekly trends in outcomes for participant

(a) Wellbeing Index



(b) Stress Index



(c) Partner Engagement Index



(d) Purpose



Notes: This figure shows the results of our weekly surveys. (a) is an index of how the respondent is currently feeling and how many days they felt well in the past seven. (b) is an index created from the number of days in the past seven that the respondent had trouble sleeping, felt nervous, or stressed. A higher value indicates less stress. (c) is an index of whether the respondent engaged their partner in case of disagreement, and whether they were successfully able to change their mind. (d) asks the respondent to rate themselves relative to someone who does the most for their family. Each figure plots the impact of the work treatment on the participant by gender and by week relative to the control arm. The estimates to the right of the dotted line represent the pooled effect across all six weeks.

E Labor Supply Elicitation

INTRODUCTION TO RESPONDENTS You may recall you previously worked with us. We now have extra budget to offer this type of work for one more week. This will be the last time we will be able to offer any type of work opportunity in the camps.

We have a work opportunity for four days. You will receive at least 200 taka for each day of work. This means that you will receive at least 800 taka for the next week. You must come to the collection point next week for your work to be reviewed, to answer the questions and collect your earnings, you cannot send someone else on your behalf.

Now let me tell you about the work opportunity. We are conducting a research project in which we are trying to understand how you feel about life and how you spend your days in the camps. You do not have to accept the job, but if you do, it will help us with our research. Does it make sense to you?

INITIAL SCREEN: Would you AND your spouse be interested in doing this survey work for four days in the near future? We can guarantee a rate of 200 taka per day, or 800 taka per week. Please note that the work must be completed every day you are assigned without mistakes in order to receive payment. This would be the only week we are able to offer you this opportunity.

PRESENTING CHOICE We only have enough funding to offer the work opportunity for you OR your spouse. Again, we can guarantee 200 taka per day, or 800 taka per week. Who would you prefer to receive this opportunity?

It doesn't matter to us who does the work. We are happy with you doing it or your spouse doing it, but we do need to know ahead of time. Please tell me who, yourself or your spouse, you would prefer takes this opportunity.

EXPLAINING SWTICH POINT Now, we want to understand how strong your preference is that word_pref (name_pref) work. We want to understand how much money it would take for you to switch your preference for who works to word_not_pref (name_not_pref).

For example, you said that you prefer that word_pref (name_pref) works if both you and your spouse can make 200 taka per day. You may even prefer that word_pref (name_pref) works if word_not_pref (name_not_pref) can make 250 taka per day, while word_pref (name_pref) only makes 200 taka per day. But if word_not_pref (name_not_pref) has the opportunity to make 300 taka per day, perhaps you prefer that word_not_pref (name_not_pref) works instead. This is just an example – there is no right answer, and we want to understand what you really want.

Please answer as honestly as possible, because after you give us the wage at which where you are willing to switch the work opportunity to word_not_pref (name_not_pref), my computer will randomly choose an option given by you or your spouse. (Recall that your spouse is also answering this survey.) There is also one random amount that the computer can pick. This is the "secret-keeping" choice. Why the "secret-keeping" choice? We are adding this to ensure that your choice remains secret from your spouse. Suppose you draw an wage that you have not seen before. This could be the amount that your spouse chose for you or it could be the secret-keeping choice. There is no way for you to know. The same applies for your spouse; there is no way for them to know your choices. We do this so that you can be assured that your choices are known only to you and me. I will not share any information about what you choose in private with your spouse.

Either you or your spouse will then be offered the job for the wage that the computer randomly chooses. Does that make sense?

ELICITING SWTICH POINT If we offered word_not_pref (name_not_pref): [INCREASING AMOUNTS FROM 200 TAKA] per day of work, would you prefer that they work. Remember, the other option is that we pay word_pref 200 taka per day to do this work.