Wei Li

Associate Professor
phone 604 822 2839
location_on Iona Building 154
file_download Download CV

Research Area

About

I became deeply interested in the interaction of information and incentives in various economics and political environment during my master studies at Harvard University. I continued to pursue this topic at MIT, where I obtained my Ph.D.

My research fields consist of contract theory, applied game theory, and information economics.  The overriding theme of my research is how the presence of asymmetric information affects people’s incentive to communicate truthfully, why many commonly-observed channels of communication exist as they do, and how we should design communication protocols to best adapt to these incentives.

In my spare time, I enjoy reading, yoga and arts in all its glorious forms.

 


Research

Cognitively-Constrained Learning from Neighbors. (with Xu Tan), Games and Economic Behavior 129 (2021), p. 32-54. 

Locally Bayesian learning in networks. (with Xu Tan), Theoretical Economics 15 (2020), p. 239–278.

Changing One’s Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols.
Review of Economic Studies (2007), 74(4), p. 1175-1194.

Drive and Talent. (with Botond Koszegi), Journal of the European Economic Association (2008), 6(1), p. 210-236.

Peddling Influence through Intermediaries. American Economic Review (2010), 100(3), p. 1136–1162.

Signaling Drive over the Long Term. Economics Letters (2010), 109(3), p. 164-167. [go to paper][/accordion]

Well Informed Intermediaries in Strategic Communication. Economic Inquiry, (2012), 50(2), p. 380-398.

Misinformation. (with Li, Hao), International Economic Review (2013), 54(1), p. 253-277.

Optimal Limited Authority for Principal. (with Anton Kolotilin and Li, Hao), Journal of Economic Theory (2013), 148(6), p. 2344–2382.


Wei Li

Associate Professor
phone 604 822 2839
location_on Iona Building 154
file_download Download CV

I became deeply interested in the interaction of information and incentives in various economics and political environment during my master studies at Harvard University. I continued to pursue this topic at MIT, where I obtained my Ph.D.

My research fields consist of contract theory, applied game theory, and information economics.  The overriding theme of my research is how the presence of asymmetric information affects people’s incentive to communicate truthfully, why many commonly-observed channels of communication exist as they do, and how we should design communication protocols to best adapt to these incentives.

In my spare time, I enjoy reading, yoga and arts in all its glorious forms.

 

Cognitively-Constrained Learning from Neighbors. (with Xu Tan), Games and Economic Behavior 129 (2021), p. 32-54. 

Locally Bayesian learning in networks. (with Xu Tan), Theoretical Economics 15 (2020), p. 239–278.

Changing One's Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols.
Review of Economic Studies (2007), 74(4), p. 1175-1194.

Drive and Talent. (with Botond Koszegi), Journal of the European Economic Association (2008), 6(1), p. 210-236.

Peddling Influence through Intermediaries. American Economic Review (2010), 100(3), p. 1136–1162.

Signaling Drive over the Long Term. Economics Letters (2010), 109(3), p. 164-167. [go to paper]

Well Informed Intermediaries in Strategic Communication. Economic Inquiry, (2012), 50(2), p. 380-398.Misinformation. (with Li, Hao), International Economic Review (2013), 54(1), p. 253-277.Optimal Limited Authority for Principal. (with Anton Kolotilin and Li, Hao), Journal of Economic Theory (2013), 148(6), p. 2344–2382.[/accordion]

Wei Li

Associate Professor
phone 604 822 2839
location_on Iona Building 154
file_download Download CV

I became deeply interested in the interaction of information and incentives in various economics and political environment during my master studies at Harvard University. I continued to pursue this topic at MIT, where I obtained my Ph.D.

My research fields consist of contract theory, applied game theory, and information economics.  The overriding theme of my research is how the presence of asymmetric information affects people’s incentive to communicate truthfully, why many commonly-observed channels of communication exist as they do, and how we should design communication protocols to best adapt to these incentives.

In my spare time, I enjoy reading, yoga and arts in all its glorious forms.

 

Cognitively-Constrained Learning from Neighbors. (with Xu Tan), Games and Economic Behavior 129 (2021), p. 32-54. 

Locally Bayesian learning in networks. (with Xu Tan), Theoretical Economics 15 (2020), p. 239–278.

Changing One's Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols.
Review of Economic Studies (2007), 74(4), p. 1175-1194.

Drive and Talent. (with Botond Koszegi), Journal of the European Economic Association (2008), 6(1), p. 210-236.

Peddling Influence through Intermediaries. American Economic Review (2010), 100(3), p. 1136–1162.

Signaling Drive over the Long Term. Economics Letters (2010), 109(3), p. 164-167. [go to paper]

Well Informed Intermediaries in Strategic Communication. Economic Inquiry, (2012), 50(2), p. 380-398.Misinformation. (with Li, Hao), International Economic Review (2013), 54(1), p. 253-277.Optimal Limited Authority for Principal. (with Anton Kolotilin and Li, Hao), Journal of Economic Theory (2013), 148(6), p. 2344–2382.[/accordion]